In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle highlighted the connection between ethics and politics.
Few scientific discoveries have elicited more enduring concern among scholars, government officials, and the general public than the permissibility of conducting research on embryos in general, and human embryonic stem cells (hESC) and cloning research in particular. Governments are challenged to with the vexing question of how to balance the therapeutic prospects of hESC and cloning research with the complex socio-ethical and moral issues involved.
Countries have framed the policy debates surrounding embryo, stem cell and cloning research differently. The historical, cultural and sociological context, the institutional framework, and the mobilization of stakeholders are factors that help explain why countries that seemingly share similar socio-religious beliefs have adopted diametrically opposite public policies. Central to the framing of the debate has been the social construction of the human embryo. The political evaluation of stem cell lines derived from human embryos necessarily involves determining the moral -and, a fortiori, the legal-standing of the embryo. However, most national policies regulating embryonic and stem cell research lack internal consistency with respect to their views regarding the moral and legal status attributed to the embryo.
Though embryonic and stem cell research are closely linked to the broader debate about human cloning, and although government funding of research implicitly encourages such research, few countries have adopted a systematic, comprehensive legal and ethical framework governing the regulation of these technologies.
While adopting legislation is often difficult to achieve in this sensitive area, setting ethical, professional as well as quality and safety assurances and standards that are reasonable or coherent for all members of a pluralistic society should be an achievable goal. Otherwise, we risk being entrapped in a dialogue of the deaf, a policy stalemate, in which market forces undermine democratic processes. 3 We maintain that public policies should be designed to adapt to both changing social circumstances and to scientific progress. However, they often fail to address issues in a prospective manner. A good example of this is the absence of public policies addressing the socio-ethical (and legal) issues that potential clinical, experimental, and therapeutic applications of stem cell and cloning research could pose. For instance, which safeguards should be in place to ensure that only safe and effective cell therapies will be brought to the bedside? 4 Many governments justify their public policies based on an alleged scientific consensus that the potential benefits of hESC and therapeutic/research cloning (as opposed to reproductive cloning) outweigh moral reservations. These governments are further challenged to deliver results expeditiously in light of heightened public expectations for cures and treatments, while ensuring protections of the rights of research subjects and patients, 5 the recent scandal in South Korea being the most notorious example. 6 Discussions about the ethics of using stem cells derived from embryos will always persist. Is this an insurmountable problem? Is public policy on morally contentious issues only feasible when there is a high level of consensus? Can we overcome this challenge while still respecting democratic principles? A society's choice regarding which scientific advances to foster and which to discourage also reflects its ethical priorities. As Laritzen points out, "the fundamental question raised by stem cell research is not about the embryo. Instead, it is about the future toward which biotechnology beckons us. Most succinctly, the question is: Does contemporary biotechnology, including or perhaps especially stem cell research, open the door to a posthuman future?"
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This article provides an overview of (I) the moral and legal status of the human embryo and of the (II) regulatory approaches to embryonic stem cells and cloning research by comparing the regulatory frameworks of 50 countries. 8 The major goal of this study is to provide and analytical understanding of the policy landscape 5 As noted in a recent editorial: "the drive to be the first one to provide cell lines for therapy could compromise safety for recipients and could lead this technology into the realms of quackery." Peter Braude, Stephen Minger & Ruth Warwick, "Stem Cell Therapy: Hope or Hype?" Editorial, (2005) 330 BMJ 1159. 6 In two Science papers published in 2004, Dr. Woo Suk Hwang claimed to have created patient-specific stem cells by somatic cell nuclear transfer (research cloning). Later, on December 2005, a Seoul National University (SNU) investigative committee issued a report concluding that Dr. Hwang and his team had fabricated those results. Moreover, the committee also concluded that Hwang's had used over 2,000 oocytes for his experiments and not the 427 oocytes he had claimed. Furthermore, oocyte donors were not properly informed about the health risks that may result from the donations, some of them were coerced to donate and 66 of them received financial compensation. Following the conclusions of the SNU committee -and with the agreement of few of the authors-the editors of Science decided to retract both papers. The Hwang scandal has prompted the Korean National Bioethics Committee to reconsider whether to permit further cloning research. around the globe, with an aim to contribute to worldwide policy debates. The comparison of these policies underscores the hurdles that scientific consortia involving international jurisdictions and policy frameworks have to confront, as well as the challenges facing the international harmonization of such policies.
I. The Human Embryo: Moral and Legal Status
Much of the ethical and policy debate has focused on the moral status of the human embryo. The puzzling question as to whether the human embryo should be granted full personhood status, or at minimum, be recognized as a potential person, has no simple answer. The dilemma itself provides an explanation of how the regulatory models surrounding this issue differ: some countries have used the moral status criterion explicitly for the framing of public policy, 9 while others have used the criterion implicitly.
It has proven to be difficult to render an account of when human life begins and what moral -and, a fortiori, legal -status should be ascribed to the human embryo. In the majority of the countries surveyed, the human embryo has been bestowed with an intermediate or gradualist moral status; that is, the embryo is considered more than a simple clump of cells 10 but less than a full human person. Though some recognition is present across the restrictive-liberal policy design continuum, this view is most compatible with an intermediate policy approach.
Under a gradualist position, embryo research is prima facie ethically acceptable. Yet it is restricted to a demonstration of the 'special respect' or 'serious moral consideration' the embryo is deemed to have due to its potential to become a human being . 11 The language adopted in some policy provisions constitutes 9 E.g., the constitutions of Ireland and Ecuador which maintain the right to life from conception. illustrative examples of the special respect conferred on the human embryo.
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For instance, guidelines in India state that, "respect for the embryo's moral status can be shown by careful regulation of conditions of research and safeguards".
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The French National Consultative Ethics Committee recommends that, "the human embryo must, as soon as it is formed, receive the respect owed to its status," 14 without providing further explanation. Paradoxically, appeals to 'human dignity' as a criterion for embryo policy are not infrequent. 15 For example, Estonian, Finish, Swedish and Swiss policies prohibit "abusing" or "damaging" the embryo with the aim to protect its "dignity". 16 Moreover, guidelines adopted in Japan assert, "human embryos and hES cells shall be handled carefully and conscientiously without violating human dignity."
17
Australian ethical guidelines prescribe that "respect for the dignity and wellbeing of the mother and the embryo must take precedence over any expected benefits of knowledge." 18 12 "…the embryo's value is symbolic rather than intrinsic or independent. The imprudent, instrumental use of embryos is prohibited since this might otherwise undermine the protection of other, more developed forms of human life. This means that the embryo is entitled to a certain degree of protection, due to 'importance by association'. With the embryo as the locus of ethical (and legal) concern, it is therefore critically important how the term is defined. Yet many countries have failed to incorporate a definition of the term 'embryo' into their policies or, have provided a definition that left certain human embryos (e.g. created by somatic cell nuclear transfer) outside the scope of the legal definition. Moreover, those that have a definition often lack a consistent and precise use of the term or they rely on a "circular" definition that contains the same concept that is supposed to be defined. 19 Some countries have defined the embryo by reference to a particular point in time. For instance, legislation in South Africa, Australia, and Singapore, along with Indian guidelines, refer to the 'embryo' as a human offspring in the first 8 weeks from the moment of conception. 20 In Canadian legislation, the embryo is referred to as a "human organism during the first 56 days of its development following fertilization or creation."
21 Whereas in other jurisdictions, the embryo is defined in reference to a broad time frame: a "fertilised ovum at all stages of development" (Iceland, Estonia, United Kingdom, Finland, South Korea). 22 Final-19 E.g., Australian legislation states that: "a human embryo means a live embryo that has a human genome or an altered human genome and that has been developing for less than 8 weeks since the appearance of 2 pro-nuclei or the initiation of its development by other means. ly, recognizing that any precise indication of time is always arbitrary, other countries have opted to define the embryo according to its capacity to develop into an individual or a human being (e.g. New Zealand, Belgium, Japan and Germany).
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As we will see, attempts to create a moral (and legal) separation between embryo protection, destruction and use (e.g. for medically assisted procreation, to derive embryonic stem cell lines or to study cell lines already derived) are often artificial and lack moral consistency.
Probably the most ethically coherent -albeit contentious -policy regarding embryo protection and use is found in countries adopting a very restrictive policy framework. Under this approach, embryo research, cryopreservation and destruction is prohibited (e.g. Austria, Ireland and Italy). 24 Certainly, this assessment does not take into account the medical (e.g. health) and broader social consequences arising from these policies. Indeed, here, all embryos created through assisted reproductive techniques must be implanted, regardless of medical indication or the couples' wishes.
In most of the jurisdictions surveyed, regardless of their policy design, there are provisions mandating the destruction of cryopreserved embryos (created either for reproductive and/or research purposes) after the expiration of the statutory storage period, 25 or at the embryo donor's request.
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Though the destruction of embryos after long storage periods is often inevitable due to safety concerns, the ethical consistency of provisions that forego their donation for reproductive purposes, or for its use in research, while at the same time claiming to confer a 'special respect' to the human embryo is questionable. Allowing childless couples to procreate or, using embryos for ethically approved and scientifically sound research would be the most appropriate way to grant 'serious moral consideration' to human embryos already created for reproductive to a fertilized egg (or segmented cell) from the moment of fertilization to the point of time at which all organs of the given organism have developed embryologically." 23 purposes. 27 Otherwise, ethical consistency would mandate the adoption of policies that avoid the existence of supernumerary embryos by limiting or regulating their creation through assisted reproductive technologies.
Moreover, irrespective of moral and legal embryo status, another additional safeguard to the prohibition on developing a human embryo beyond 14 days from fertilization -or until the formation of the primitive streak -, is that a number of jurisdictions explicitly require the destruction of embryo after the aforementioned period.
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Regardless of attempts to legislate it away, direct or indirect inducement and complicity are necessarily involved in the research enterprise. The special respect or moral value attributed to the human embryo in most of the public policies surveyed would be considered morally consistent when such policies also require a scientific and ethical justification for embryo use and destruction.
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II. Regulatory Approaches
Two approaches shape emerging policy trends: a public and a private public ordering approach. A public ordering approach involves state-led initiatives to frame emerging biotechnologies. Due to the different regulatory systems adopted throughout the world, it is difficult to make broad generalizations about the current legitimacy or acceptability of hESC in both public and private ordering systems. These systems are a reflection of the legal traditions, cultural and socio-religious beliefs, and economic interests which inform and shape public policy on embryonic, 27 Legislation adopted in Estonia, Finland, Greece, Slovenia. Sweden, UK, Canada, Japan and South Korea allow for the donation of embryos for research when no longer needed for reproductive purposes or after the expiration of their statutory storage period. In Switzerland the Embryonic Research Act (2004) explicitly allows the donation of 'excess' or supernumerary embryos for stem cell derivation. In this order of ideas, the Portuguese National Council of Ethics for the Life Sciences in "Opinion No. 44/CNECV/04 on Assisted Medical Reproduction" (July 2004) states: "The National Council has taken the position that research with no benefit for the embryo concerned is illegitimate. Exceptionally, when no other alternative than the destruction of the embryo is possible, scientific research with no benefit to the embryo could be conducted for the benefit of humanity." 28 E.g. Australia, Canada, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Japan, Slovenia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. 29 For example, Israeli guidelines require that "the research and possible applications (of the research) be justified in terms of the benefit that it offers to humanity'. Within this category, legislative approaches can range from liberal to restrictive (both of which use administrative oversight), and usually involve criminal prohibitions. For example, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, and the United Kingdom, with different degrees of permissiveness and oversight, have enacted comprehensive laws regulating and setting conditions for embryonic, stem cell, and cloning research. However, even among public ordering countries that have adopted statutory requirements in relation to oversight and enforcement mechanisms for hESC research and cloning research, we will see that there are significant differences as well as similarities.
Other countries have opted for a private ordering approach through self-regulation, thus permitting these technologies if they follow professional guidelines, often set by national bioethics committees. The regulation of embryonic stem cell and cloning research in India, Israel, and China are examples of a private ordering approach since these countries have adopted professional guidelines.
The following analysis of the 50 countries under study demonstrates a mix of private-public ordering approaches in the case of human embryonic research. Before turning to embryonic research specifically, it should be noted that the debate on human reproductive cloning is without a doubt influential in the framing of policy responses. Indeed, an emerging pattern found in all these countries is to adopt prohibitions on the reproductive cloning of human beings and/or embryos. The debate that took place at the United Nations on the adoption of an international instrument banning human reproductive cloning indicates that an effective consensus exists among the 191 U.N. member states regarding human reproductive cloning. This consensus deems human reproductive cloning "ethically repugnant and contrary to human rights and dignity." 31 In terms of national policies, all countries surveyed ( It is striking that a negligible number of countries have adopted national laws (6) or guidelines (1) specifically allowing human cloning for therapeutic or research purposes. 42 Still, the majority of countries worldwide have no explicit policy regarding research cloning.
In relation to human embryonic research generally, where public policy has been adopted, the majority of countries allow research on human embryos or gametes under strict conditions (16 countries by national laws, 43 7 by guidelines 44 ), while a few countries explicitly prohibit research on embryos by law. 45 The remaining (21) countries surveyed have no explicit policy on embryonic research. An interesting pattern is evident in the regulation of human embryonic stem cell research: where public policy has been adopted, the majority of countries allow the procurement of hESC lines and research on supernumerary embryos (16 countries by law, 46 4 by guidelines 47 ). In addition, only 8 countries explicitly prohibit by law the procurement of hESC from surplus embryos and subsequent research. 48 A very small number of countries prohibit research on embryos to create hESC lines but allow the importation of hESC lines (e.g. Germany, 49 
France 50
). The remaining countries surveyed have no explicit policy regarding hESC research.
Having briefly surveyed the "cloning" landscape, we can identify three approaches as characterizing emerging policy trends in the broad area of research into human reproduction. 51 In categorizing countries according to their policy design, we found that the majority of countries that have adopted public policies on embryonic, stem cell, and cloning research could be labelled "intermediate" Restrictive Policies
In a restrictive policy framework, many techniques are prohibited (i.e. reproductive and therapeutic cloning, embryonic research) via tight regulations or blank prohibitions. 57 These countries 58 advocate strong government intervention and have a very critical attitude towards scientific discoveries. A closer scrutiny of the principles underlying their policies demonstrates that restrictive policies, in general, aim to strongly protect the human embryo. Their goal is to protect human life (and dignity) and society at large from the potential negative effects and presumed dangers of these technologies (e.g. instrumentalisation and commodification of potential human life, as well as the exploitation of women and children). 59 We can further sub-divide restrictive policies into 3 types: namely, policies prescribing the impermissibility (prohibition) of human embryonic stem cell derivation, the impermissibility of using hESC lines or their products, though some 53 Iceland, Lithuania, Denmark, Slovenia, Germany, France, Ireland, Georgia, Taiwan, Austria, Italy, Norway, Poland, Costa Rica, Colombia, and Panama. 54 Belgium, China, Japan, Israel, Singapore, South Korea and United Kingdom. 55 E.g. Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Brazil, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland and United Kingdom. This trend toward liberalization of policies is also noted in proposed legislation currently under debate (e.g. Czech Republic, France, Malta, Mexico, Spain and Ukraine). 56 E.g. Italy, Panama and Colombia. 57 E.g., legislation adopted in Austria, Georgia and Italy prescribe that fertilized human oocytes and cells may be used only for medically assisted procreation. Moreover, in Slovakia, "research without medical indication is not permitted on human embryos or fetuses." 58 Supra note 45. This shall be done in accordance with the principles of respect for human dignity, human rights and personal integrity (…)."
exceptions exist for imported hESC lines; and finally, the impermissibility of government funding. Policies under the first type ban all embryonic research, with the possible exception of treatment beneficial to that particular embryo or treatments necessary to achieve a pregnancy (e.g. Italy, 60 Austria 61 ). In all practicality this constitutes a ban and, thus, research migrates elsewhere (sometimes to countries where there is minimal ethical oversight).
The second type attempts to satisfy all sides by setting a cut-off date after which stem cells may not be taken from surplus embryos, but permits research on stem cells that were derived before the cut-off date, and then, only when they come from outside the country. This compromised approach found in France 62 and Germany 63 for example, is a partial antidote to prohibition. Still, these policies set a dubious ethical standard by deeming unethical both embryo use and the derivation of embryonic stem cell lines from embryos from the home country while allowing the importation of embryonic stem cell lines derived elsewhere.
Finally, under the third type, the state cannot allow or use public funds for certain activities. This approach, found in the restrictions on federal government funding in the USA, is problematic because it sets two standards for the governance of research. In some cases the private sector is then left unregulated, thus constituting in reality a "laissez-faire" policy. 64 Under the last two sub-typologies of restrictive approaches, governments, while presenting themselves as virtuous protectors of ethics and morality by withholding direct involvement on embryo destruction, set artificial boundaries in order to 60 The disadvantage of the "laissez-faire" approach is that it precludes oversight for safety/ quality concerns and provokes regulatory arbitrage-seeking overseas venues to avoid local research regulation.
benefit from practices that are deemed unethical. Thus, it is clear why these policy approaches are deemed hypocritical as they rest their ethical grounding on the lack of ethics elsewhere. For instance, if the importation of embryonic stem cell lines is allowed because somebody else has destroyed embryos, are the importers not complicit in the destruction of embryos?
b) Intermediate Policies
As mentioned above, the majority of countries surveyed fall under the intermediate policy approach. 65 Hereunder, a wide range of techniques are allowed but controlled and closely monitored by modest state intervention. Under this approach, stem cell research on supernumerary embryos from IVF treatment is permitted, but the creation of embryos specifically for research purposes is prohibited.
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The overall goal of these policies is to provide efficient and safe mechanisms for conducting research. New Zealand's Act on Human Assisted Reproductive Technology No. 92, 2004 provides an illustrative example of these goals by stating that its purpose is, "to provide a robust and flexible framework for regulating and guiding the performance of medical assisted reproductive procedures and the conduct of human reproductive research." Similar rationale is found in India's Council of Medical Research Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research on Human Subjects (2000), which state, "any system of ethical guidelines on research needs to be cognizant of, and informed by, a sensitive balance of the risks and benefits" for society.
Intermediate policies are often the result of political compromises and trade-offs and seek to balance diverse -if not conflicting -interests and values that could otherwise thwart the adoption of any legal framework. Because of this, they are at risk of being ambiguous and internally inconsistent. The latter is commonly reflected in policies granting moral and legal status to the human embryo, and in policies regulating embryo destruction following research or medically assisted reproduction.
c) Liberal Policies
Finally, in liberal policies, most technologies are permitted provided procedural rules and governance are observed. These policies permit the creation of embryos 65 Supra note 44. 66 E.g. Canada, Denmark, Estonia and Australia.
for research purposes as well as for the derivation of stem cell lines and for research cloning (mostly by de facto or by case-by-case approval by a governmental agency or licensing authority). Yet, even under this more permissive approach, human reproductive cloning is banned.
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The overall goal of liberal policies is to promote scientific and medical progress with the belief that it is beneficial to humanity. At the same time these policies seek to regulate the interest of patients and the public health, in addition to addressing societal concerns 68 ). Unfortunately, these policies usually "fail to explicitly enunciate the value-choices underlying their acceptance or to explain why certain constraints have been instituted."
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The challenge for countries adopting a liberal policy framework is to provide a coherent, transparent and flexible, yet enforceable, system that also takes into 67 E.g. Belgium, Sweden and the UK. , "aims to enhance the health of human beings and the quality of human life by creating conditions that allow for the development of life sciences and biotechnologies that can be used to prevent or cure human diseases. Additionally, this Act aims to protect human dignity and to prevent harm to human beings by ensuring that these life sciences and biotechnologies are developed safely and in accordance with the principles of bioethics." 71 "The object of the HFEA Code of Practice is … to secure the safety or efficacy of particular clinical or scientific practices. It is concerned with areas of practice which raise fundamental ethical and social questions. In framing the Code of Practice, the HFEA has been guided both by the requirements of the HFEA Act and by: -The respect which is due to human life at all states of development.
-A recognition of the benefits, both to individuals and to society, which can flow from the responsible pursuit of medical and scientific knowledge". account opposing socio-cultural and ethical values or beliefs. Moreover, when governance depends on regulatory agencies that decide on a case-by-case basis, there is flexibility but also the risk of arbitrary applications or inconsistencies; and if governed by guidelines or professional codes alone, without active monitoring and sanctions, the risk is to end up as self-serving and following a marketconsumer model.
Conclusion
At first glance, the determination of the moral status of the human embryo influences possible responses to questions of the permissibility of, restrictions on, and prohibitions on embryonic research. No matter what policy framework is adopted-whether liberal, intermediate or restrictive-the mechanisms for assessing and regulating embryonic, stem cell and cloning research must keep pace with the scientific discoveries. They must also address ethical concerns, with a flexible and transparent regulatory system able to both prospectively cover new scientific advances, to regulate both private and public funds to ensure against double standards, and finally to be enforceable. "Good" guidelines are useless if they can be disregarded with impunity.
In an era of globalize science, common scientific, regulatory and ethical standards are necessary. These (minimal) common denominators are required to foster collaboration in stem cell research (and its future therapeutic applications) at the national and international levels. Most importantly, harmonization of these standards is needed to avoid negative repercussions for health, safety, and patient rights. 74 Yet, considering the multiplicity of laws and guidelines already in existence, the lack of moral and legal consistency within these documents, and the politics involved in the embryo debate, the harmonization of scientific, regulatory and ethical standards will be very difficult.
The consequences of discord are too high to allow the inconsistency to continue. If the idealistic pursuit of knowledge and the desire to improve health are not sufficient motivation for international discussion and harmonization, perhaps the spectre of a dialogue of the deaf, with market forces driving progress on this ethically sensitive issue will bring stakeholders to the discussion table.
Aristotle warned humanity that ethics and politics are connected. Two thousand years later, we have yet to move beyond that observation. Advances in science force us to determine whether morally contentious issues require consensus, compromise and political conviction. Can we address such divisive issues while holding intact our democratic principles and socio-cultural values? In short, the challenges is to defend the integrity of ethical and legal principles -the sooner the better.
